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Abstract—An argument is seen as reasons in
favour of a claim. It is made of three parts: a set
of premises representing the reasons, a conclusion
representing the supported claim, and a connection
showing how the premises lead to the conclusion.
Arguments are frequently exchanged by human
agents in natural language (spoken or written) in
discussion, debate, negotiation, persuasion, etc. They
may be very different in that their three components
may have various forms.
In this paper, we propose a language for repre-
senting such arguments. We show that it is general
enough to capture the various forms of arguments
encountered in natural language, and that it is possi-
ble to represent attack and support relations between
arguments as formulas of the same language.
Keywords-Arguments; Representation language.
I. INTRODUCTION
An argument gives reason to support a claim
that is questionable, or open to doubt. It is made
of three parts: a set of premises representing the
reason, a conclusion representing the supported
claim, and a link showing how the premises lead to
the conclusion [13]. The link is hence the logical
part of an argument. The notion of argument
is very rich and complex. Indeed, the reason
(respectively the conclusion) varies from simple
statements to combinations of arguments, and the
link may be deductive, abductive, inductive, . . .
[3]. Let us consider the following example of a
natural language argument.
Example 1. The title and first two paragraphs
from an article on whether the London Heathrow
airport should be expanded with a third runway.
The article comes from the BBC website1.
〈claim〉 Heathrow needs more capacity.
〈\claim〉
〈reason〉 Heathrow runs at close to
100% capacity. With demand for air
travel predicted to double in a genera-
tion, Heathrow will not be able to cope
1http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7828694.stm
without a third runway, say those in
favour of the plan. 〈\reason〉
〈reason〉 Because the airport is over-
stretched, any problems which arise
cause knock-on delays. Heathrow, the
argument goes, needs extra capacity
if it is to reach the levels of service
found at competitors elsewhere in Eu-
rope, or it will be overtaken by its rivals.
〈\reason〉
In the above tagging, we have a single claim, viz
“Heathrow needs more capacity”, and we have
two reasons for this claim. Hence, we appear to
have two arguments. Each with the same claim.
However, if we look at the second reason, we see
that there are nested arguments, and so we could
deconstruct the second paragraph as follows. The
first sentence is an argument containing a reason
and claim as follows
〈reason〉 Because the airport is over-
stretched 〈\reason〉, 〈claim〉 any prob-
lems which arise cause knock-on delays.
〈\claim〉.
Then, we see that the above argument is itself a
premise for the following claim
〈claim〉 Heathrow, the argument goes,
needs extra capacity if it is to reach
the levels of service found at competi-
tors elsewhere in Europe, or it will be
overtaken by its rivals. 〈\claim〉
Putting these observations together, we could tag
the second paragraph as follows where we have
an argument as a nested reason.
〈reason〉 〈reason〉 Because the airport
is over-stretched, any problems which
arise cause knock-on delays. 〈\reason〉
〈claim〉 Heathrow, the argument goes,
needs extra capacity if it is to reach the
levels of service found at competitors
elsewhere in Europe, or it will be over-
taken by its rivals. 〈\claim〉 〈\reason〉
So the final paragraph contains an argument (i.e.
a reason with claim), this argument is the reason
for a claim within the paragraph. Furthermore,
the whole paragraph is a reason for the claim in
the title of the article.
Recently, there is growing interest in the compu-
tational models of argument community and in the
computational linguistics community in mining
arguments from texts (see for example [8], [9],
[15], [16], [20], [21], [24], [25], [26], [27], [29],
[31], [32]). An interesting challenge that is thus
arising is the choice of target formalism for repre-
senting the extracted arguments. In computational
models of argument, abstract argumentation (as
proposed by Dung [14]) and logical or structured
argumentation (as proposed in [5], [7], [17], [23])
are the two key options. Neither is ideal as a target
formalism as we outline below.
Abstract argumentation: Each argument is
atomic. There is no differentiation between
reasons and claims. So there is insufficient
structure for a target language for argument
mining.
Logical argumentation: Each argument is a
set of formulae for premises, and a formula
for a claim, where the premises imply the
claim using a given consequence operator
of a particular monotonic logic. So there
is excessive structure for a target language
for argument mining since natural language
arguments are generally enthymemes, that is
some of their premises are unstated.
In previous work [1], we have proposed a for-
mal language for representing arguments. The lan-
guage is made of formulae of the form (−)R(y) :
(−)C(x) such that e.g., R(y) : C(x) stands for y
gives reason to claim x, R(y) : −C(x) stands for y
gives reason for not claiming x, and −R(y) : C(x)
stands for y is not a reason for claiming x. The
latter form is called rejection of argument. The
link between the reason and the claim is left
implicit. We have shown that the language is
general enough to capture a wide range of types of
arguments. In this paper, we extend the language
in such a way that the reason and/or the conclusion
of an argument can also be a combination of
arguments. This allows us to capture complex
arguments like those conveyed in recommendation
letters. Consider a recommendation letter written
for someone who is applying for a position. The
main claim is that the candidate deserves the
position and the reason is a conjunction of several
arguments, each of which may be nested. Another
contribution of the paper consists of highlighting
several forms of attacks and supports between
arguments, some of them have never been defined
in computational models of arguments. We show
that each form can be defined as a formula of
the language. This allows us to represent in a
unified setting arguments and relations between
them. We show also what issues in (computa-
tional) argumentation our formalism can address.
In particular, we deal with the details of applying
our formalism in a range of cases, discussing
the significance of various forms of arguments
allowed in our formalism.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II
introduces the language. Section III shows how to
encode attacks and supports between arguments
as formulae of the language. Section IV compares
our formalism with computational argumentation
ones, and Section V describes briefly how the
language can be used as a target language for
argument mining. The last section concludes.
II. SYNTAX FOR RC FORMULAE
Our formalism for representing arguments, in-
spired by Apothe´loz [4], is built upon a classical
propositional language L(A) where A is a set
of atoms. The formulae of the language L(A)
are defined in the usual way from A and the
usual classical operators ¬,∨,∧,→,↔. Our for-
malism also uses two functions R(.) and C(.),
a disjunction operator |, a conjunction operator
&, and an additional negation operator −. Thus,
two negation operators are needed: ¬ for denying
propositional formulas (¬x denotes that x is false),
and − for denying R(.) and C(.). Please note that
¬¬x is identified with x and −−R(.) is identified
with R(.) (also, −− C(.) is identified with C(.)).
Definition 1 (RC formulae). The set of formulas
Arg(L(A)) is the smallest set such that a formula
is of the form (−)R(y) : (−)C(x) where x and y
are formulae of L(A)∪Arg(L(A)) or is a Boolean
combination of formulae of Arg(L(A)) with the
connectives | and &.
The two operators | and & connect RC
formulae as follows: R(y) : C(x) | R(z) : C(t),
R(y) : C(x) & R(z) : C(t), R(y) : C(x) |
−R(z) : C(t), R(y) : C(x) & −R(z) : C(t), . . .
Remark: Please note that −((−)R(y) :
(−)C(x)) is identified with −(−)R(y) : (−)C(x).
Each formula is either an argument or a rejec-
tion of an argument. An argument is a reason
for concluding a claim. It has two main parts:
premises (the reason) and a conclusion. An ar-
gument is interpreted as follows: its conclusion
holds because it follows, according to a given
notion, from the premises. The notion refers to
the nature of the link (e.g., the premises cause the
conclusion).
Definition 2 (Argument). An argument is a for-
mula of Arg(L(A)) of the form R(y) : (−)C(x).
The functions R and C play the roles of giving
reason and concluding, resp. They thus capture
the coupling between a reason and a conclusion.
As we will see later, the contents may be true
while the functions do not hold and vice versa. The
intuitive meaning of the two formal expressions
captured by the previous definition is as follows:
R(y) : C(x) means that
“y is a reason for concluding x”
R(y) : −C(x) means that
“y is a reason for not concluding x”
The nature of the link between the reason and
the conclusion is captured by the colon. There are
at least two reasons for leaving the link implicit.
First, natural language arguments are generally
enthymemes, thus some of their premises are
unstated. For instance, in the argument “Paul has
DNA because he is human”, there is a missing
premise which says “All humans have DNA”.
Actually, it is not always possible to make the
link explicit. The second reason is that there are
several kinds of links, each of which leads to
a particular definition of arguments. In [3], it
was shown that arguments of types “threats” and
“rewards” are defined in an abductive way, while
arguments of type “appeals to prevailing practices”
are deductive. Our purpose is to have one general
definition of argument in which all the different
types can be captured.
So far, the negation operator “−” has been used
to deny the concluding function. In what follows,
the function of giving reason can be denied as
well by placing “−” in front of R. What is denied
in this case is not the premises but rather the
idea that the premises justify the conclusion of
the argument. Such a form is called rejection of
argument since it has exactly the opposite meaning
of an argument.
Definition 3 (Rejection or anti-argument). A re-
jection of an argument is a formula of Arg(L(A))
of the form −R(y) : (−)C(x).
The intuitive meaning for these formal expres-
sions is as follows:
−R(y) : C(x) means that
“y is not a reason for concluding x”
−R(y) : −C(x) means that
“y is not a reason for not concluding x”
Example 2. Assume the propositional atoms bird,
penguin, damaged.wing (to denote animals with
a damaged wing), slightly.damaged.wing (to de-
note animals with a slightly damaged wing), and
egg.laying (to denote animals that lay eggs).
1) R(bird) : C(fly)
2) R(penguin) : C(¬fly)
3) R(bird ∧ damaged.wing) : −C(fly)
4) −R(bird ∧ slightly.damaged.wing) :
−C(fly)
5) −R(egg.laying) : C(fly)
6) −R(egg.laying) : C(¬fly)
7) −R(egg.laying) : −C(fly)
Arguments can be counterarguments for other
arguments. For instance, R(bird) : C(fly)
has R(penguin) : C(¬fly) and R(bird ∧
damaged.wing) : −C(fly) as counterarguments.
We investigate the notion of a counterargument as
RC-formulae in the next section.
III. REPRESENTING ATTACK AND SUPPORT
In structured argumentation, an attack against
a given argument consists of presenting another
argument denying one of the components of the
initial argument (i.e., premises, conclusion, link).
Thus, similar to a rejection, the aim of an attack
is to undermine an argument. The main difference
between the two lies in that the attacker provides a
reason for the attack. For instance, to undermine
the conclusion x of an argument R(y) : C(x),
one should provide another argument justifying
why ¬x holds. In contrast, a rejection needs no
justification (but it may have one). Every attack
between two arguments leads to a rejection of the
attacked argument in the following way:
If R(z) : C(w) attacks R(y) : C(x),
then R(R(z) : C(w)) : C(−R(y) : C(x)).
Note that the converse is not true, rejections might
not be transformed into an attack between a pair
of arguments. Consider the following dialogue.
Paul: Why are you late? (la).
Carla: Because I am late R(la) : C(la)
Paul: This is not a reason −R(la) : C(la)
In the example, Paul rejects Carla’s argument
without justifying why. In fact, he denies the fact
that the argument can be circular.
We now turn to showing how to detect attacks
between mined arguments, and how the language
can be used to capture them within formulae of
the language. Recall that an argument R(y) : C(x)
may be attacked on one of its components: con-
clusion, premises, the link.
There are two ways for undermining the con-
clusion of an argument: a strong way by showing
that the negation of the conclusion holds, and a
weak way by showing that the conclusion fails.
R(y) : C(x) R(z) : C(¬x)





R(y) : C(x) R(z) : −C(x)





Strong Rebuttal corresponds to the well-known
rebuttal in existing argumentation formalisms.
Example 3. Illustration for strong rebuttal: Nixon
is a quaker (nq) and Nixon is a republican (nr).
Is Nixon a pacifist (np)?
R(nq) : C(np) R(nr) : C(¬np)
R(R(nr) : C(¬np)) : C(−R(nq) : C(np))
Weak rebuttal captures somehow the so-called
undercutting relation [22]. The basic idea is to
block the application of a defeasible rule in some
cases. Let us consider the following example:
Example 4. The object is red (re) because it
looks red (lr). This argument is written in our
formalism as R(lr) : C(re). In existing argumen-
tation systems like ASPIC and ASPIC+, the hidden
assumption “Objects that look red are indeed red”
is encoded as a defeasible rule. If the object is
illuminated by red light (il), then undercutting
amounts to blocking the application of the rule,
thus blocking its conclusion re. In our language,
this is simply written as R(il) : −C(re). Unlike
Example 3, the reason in the counter-argument
(il) needs not command that the negation of the
conclusion in the attacked argument (¬re) holds.
The premises of an argument may also be
undermined in a strong or a weak way as follows:
R(y) : C(x) R(z) : C(¬y)






R(y) : C(x) R(z) : −C(y)






Strong Premise Attack amounts to the well-known
Assumption-Attack in argumentation literature.
Example 5. Illustration of strong premise attack:
The weather is good (gw) so the bbq will be a
success (bs) but weather reports predict rain (ra).
R(gw) : C(bs) R(ra) : C(¬gw)
R(R(ra) : C(¬gw)) : C(−R(gw) : C(bs))
The last component of an argument is the link
between the premises and the claim. As already
said, the link concerns the logical part of the
argument, that is the inference pattern that is used
in order to infer the conclusion from the premises.
It can be denied in three ways as follows:
R(z) : C(−R(y) : C(x)) (Strong Reason Attack)
R(z) : −C(R(y) : C(x)) (Weak Reason Attack)
−R(y) : C(x) (Pure Reason Attack)
Example 6. Consider the following abductive
argument. If all dogs are mammals (dm), then
all dogs are animals (da). All dogs are animals.
Therefore, all dogs are mammals. This argument
can be written as: R((dm → da) ∧ da) : C(dm).
Note that in spite of the premises and the con-
clusion all being true, the argument is not valid.
Indeed, it uses the inference pattern
B if A then B
A
.
Of course, it may happen that A is false although
B and if A then B are true. In the same spirit,
one may reject the initial argument by means of
a mere rejection −R((dm → da) ∧ da) : C(dm).
There are many circumstances where a rejection
can be justified, though. It would here be of the
form R(z) : C(−R((dm → da) ∧ da) : C(dm))
with z a case making the previous pattern invalid
(e.g. read da as “David is annoyed” and dm as
“David moans”, let z stand for a situation where
David is only slightly annoyed so that da is not
enough of a reason for dm).
Example 7. Consider the following argument.
90% of humans are right-handed (hrh), therefore
Paul is also right-handed (prh). The argument,
written as R(hrh) : C(prh), might be rejected
(−R(hrh) : C(prh)) because the link between the
premise hrh and the conclusion prh is invalid.
To sum up, with our logic of arguments, we
can formalize and manipulate attacks explicitly
within the logic (which is not possible in other
formal systems of argumentation), and we have a
wider range of attacks than are considered in other
formal proposals for argumentation.
Unlike attacks which express negative links be-
tween arguments, supports express positive links.
In existing literature (e.g., [11]), such links are
captured by a binary relation defined on the set
of arguments. In our approach, such an external
relation is not needed since supports can be ex-
pressed as formulae of the language. Let us now
look at various forms of support. An argument
may support another argument by approving one
of its components: premises, claim and link.
R(z) : C(y) R(y) : C(x)





R(z) : C(x) R(y) : C(x)





R(R(z) : C(t)) : C(R(y) : C(x)) (Reason Support)
R(z) : C(R(y) : C(x)) (Reason Support)
The first two relations have been presented in [10]
but both forms of link support are new.
Example 8. Consider the following dialogue.
Paul: Carl will pass his exams (pe). He is smart
(sm). R(sm) : C(pe)
John: He is moreover well prepared (wp).
R(wp) : C(pe)
John’s argument can also be interpreted in a
sense to be captured by the following argument:
R(R(wp) : C(pe)) : C(R(sm) : C(pe))
IV. COMPARISON
We have explained the language for our ap-
proach, and we now turn to comparing it with
existing approaches in the literature.
A. Implicit representation of links
In almost all works on structured argumentation
(e.g. [2], [5], [17], [23], [28]), an argument is a
set of premises that, using a notion of deriva-
tion, will lead to a conclusion. As argued in
the introduction, this definition needs a logical
representation of all the premises. This is not
viable for arguments mined from texts since they
are enthymemes (and therefore lack the explicit
representation of premises and/or claim). More-
over, in general, existing definitions capture only
one type of argument (viz. deductive arguments)
while in text or dialogue, analogical arguments are
very common. Our approach captures enthymemes
and a wide variety of types of argument (such as
abductive and inductive).
B. Capturing links not relying upon inference
As mentioned above, in almost all works on
structured argumentation, an argument relies on
a notion of derivation linking the premises of
the argument to its conclusion. However, there
arguably exist arguments that do not involve an
inference from premises to claim. An example is:
Smoking is a reason to get cancer.
Please observe that this is definitely an argument.
Though, there is no default rule to infer “getting
cancer” from “smoking”, not even a weighted
default-like rule: It does not seem right to express
that smoking entails getting cancer with likelihood
x, whatever x in [0, 1].
In other words, such arguments fall outside
the realm of the existing approaches to structured
argumentation. Nonetheless, such an argument can
be naturally expressed in the RC-formalism as:
R(s) : C(gc)
where of course we use s to mean “smoking” and
gc to mean “getting cancer”.
C. Arguing explicitly about ignorance
In our approach, it is possible to argue explicitly
about ignorance. For instance, the RC-formula
R(s) : −C(fe) can represent the argument below:
Since Carl is very smart (s), we cannot
conclude that he will fail his exams (fe).
Some approaches to structured argumentation
(e.g., [2], [23]) prevent the conclusion fe from
being deduced in an indirect way, using Pollock’s
undercutting [22] for blocking the application of
defeasibles rules as is illustrated next.
Example 9. Consider the facts F = {sm,¬wh},
the set of strict rules S = {sm → n}, the set
of defeasible rules D = {¬wh → fe}, where
fe denotes Carl will fail his exams, wh denotes
Carl worked hard, sm denotes Carl is smart. Let
n refer to the defeasible rule ¬wh → fe and
let n denote its non-application. So the strict rule
sm → n actually means that ¬wh → fe does
not apply in the context of sm. The following four
arguments can be built:
• a1 : (< sm >, sm)
• a2 : (< ¬wh >,¬wh)
• a3 : (< sm, sm→ n >, n)
• a4 : (< ¬wh,¬wh → fe >, fe)
Argument a3 is a Pollock undercutting of a4.
Using Pollock undercutting as the attack relation,
{a1, a2, a3} is the only stable extension. So, the
set of conclusions drawn from the theory at hand
is {sm,¬wh, n}. As expected, fe is not inferred.
There is however no argument expressing that sm
is the main reason for not having fe. While this
approach is worthwhile in reasoning, it is not nat-
ural in dialogues where agents provide arguments
for blocking conclusions. Our solution (i.e., using
an argument of the form R(sm) : −C(fe)) makes
the connection explicit.
Instead of using a succinct formula such as
R(y) : −C(x) where x and y are propositions,
structured argumentation identifies two arguments
A1 and A2 where the reason (premises) of A1 in-
clude x, and the claim of A2 is y. Furthermore, for
structured argumentation, the claim of A1, and the
premises of A2, need to be determined in order to
have the attack defined (which can be problematic
when they are not explicitly represented in the text
or dialogue). Consider the following argument:
Since Carl is at the university (u), he cannot
conclude whether his printer is delivered at
home (de)
that can be represented simply by R(u) : −C(de)
in our approach. Contrastedly, in structured ar-
gumentation, not even blocking the conclusion
de is possible without further information being
available. In structured argumentation, not only is
there need for an argument A with some explicit
premises and claim de, but, in addition, a coun-
terargument B is needed that either attacks the
premises of A′ or the derivation of the claim de
from those premises.
D. Complex arguments
Our approach supports the representation of
nesting of reasons. This means an argument or a
rejection of an argument can be used as a reason
or as a claim in an argument or rejection of
an argument. The premises and conclusion can
also be a conjunction or disjunction of arguments.
This provides a rich formalism for representing
arguments and rejections of arguments as arising
in texts and dialogues.
DefLog [28] offers a language for representing
arguments that in some respects is similar to our
Definition 2. It has reasons and claims. These are
atomic, or for claims, they can be nested argu-
ments. So unlike our approach, DefLog does not
support Boolean formulae as reasons or claims,
and DefLog does not support nested reasons. Also,
DefLog does not support rejections of arguments.
In [6], [19], abstract argumentation has been
extended with attacks on attacks, but this form of
meta-argumentation does not support differentia-
tion of reasons and claims, and it does not support
rejection of arguments. Meta-argumentation has
also been proposed in logic-based approaches to
argumentation (such as [18], [30]). These allow
arguments to appear in the premises or claims of
other arguments. However, these approaches as-
sume explicit representation of the logical formu-
lae in the premises by which the claim is derived,
and they do not support rejection of arguments.
Also, they do not support arguing about ignorance.
E. Rejection of arguments
Our approach incorporates the representation of
a rejection of an argument. This is different to a
counterargument, as we have argued in Section
III. Approaches to structured argumentation (such
as [5], [7], [17], [23]) represent counterarguments,
but there is no proposal that represents rejection
of arguments.
F. Explicit representation of attacks
Our approach represents rejections of argu-
ments, which are essential for representing di-
verse mined arguments. Consequently, an attack
is represented as an explicit construct in the lan-
guage. Attacks can also be justified (e.g. R(x) :
C(−R(y) : C(z)). As said before, no other
logic-based approach to modelling argumentation
provides a language for expressing rejection of
arguments and attacks in the object language.
A proposal for introducing support and attacks
relations into the language is E-DeLP [12], but
the formalism only allows reasons to support or
to attack a claim, and the claim can only be a
defeasible rule. It therefore seems unlikely to be
a suitable target language for representing mined
arguments.
V. TARGET LANGUAGE FOR ARGUMENT
MINING
Next we consider how our formalism can be
used as a target language for argument mining.
Tagging is an important step in developing a nat-
ural language processing system (an NLP system).
For this, we need to annotate a corpora of items
of text that we use for training an NLP system
(for instance based on statistical natural language
processing and/or machine learning). The aim is
that after training, the NLP system can automat-
ically tag previously unseen items of text (i.e.
items of text not used for training) correctly. Since
there is often a subjective aspect to the tagging.
each of text is tagged by a number of people
independently.
Example 10. We return to Example 1. We use the
tag x1 to tag a string in the title, we use the tags
y1 and y2 to tag strings in the first paragraph, and
we use the tags z1, z2, and z3 to tag strings in the
second paragraph. For each tag p, 〈p〉 denotes
the start of the string, and 〈\p〉 denotes the end of
the string. From the following tagged strings, we
can obtained the RC-formulae R(y1) : C(x1) and
R(R(R(z1) : C(z2)) : C(z3)) : C(x1).
• 〈x1〉Heathrow needs more capacity〈\x1〉
• 〈y1〉Heathrow runs at close to 100% capac-
ity. With demand for air travel predicted to
double in a generation, Heathrow will not be
able to cope without a third runway〈\y1〉, say
those in favour of the plan.
• 〈z1〉Because the airport is over-
stretched〈\z1〉, 〈z2〉any problems which arise
cause knock-on delays〈\z2〉. 〈z3〉Heathrow,
the argument goes, needs extra capacity if
it is to reach the levels of service found at
competitors elsewhere in Europe, or it will
be overtaken by its rivals〈\z3〉.
So, as a target language, RC-formulae cap-
ture the connection between reasons and claims,
and as illustrated in Example 10, this connection
can be nested. Furthermore, arguments and anti-
arguments can be nested as reasons and claims.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper deals with the definition of a formal-
ism for representing natural language arguments.
The formalism provides a wide range of bene-
fits including: (1) Target language for arguments,
mined from texts or dialogues, that is between
abstract and logical argumentation; (2) Represen-
tation of any type of arguments in a unified setting
(threats, rewards, examples, . . .); (3) Represen-
tation of arguments in favour of ignorance; (4)
Explicit representation of attacks and supports in
the object language; (5) Practical representation
of enthymemes; (6) Representation of rejections
(anti-arguments); and (7) Nesting and combina-
tions of arguments and rejections.
This paper builds on a previous work [1] which
it extends in the following way. Whereas [1]
focussed on the inference system for RC-formulae,
this paper deals with a number of notions in ar-
gumentation that can be captured by our approach
and which facilitate the representation and reason-
ing with arguments as arising in AI applications
involving text and dialogue. Indeed, representation
of attack and support, nature of the reason-claim
link and its underlying requirements/conditions,
ability to capture mere ignorance, difference be-
tween rejections and counter-arguments, are all
topics in this paper that were not addressed in [1].
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